"Fighting on two fronts? How individuals with connections in the 'DPR' are being placed in leadership roles within the Territorial Defense."

Although the position of commander is typically held by senior military officers, Sergey Salavatov acquired it while still a lieutenant. Only after his appointment was he promoted to senior lieutenant, but even that is not considered a senior officer rank.

“Putin, Donbas Awaits” and the Foreign Legion Uniform

Here are screenshots from 2014 taken from the social media accounts of the current commander of the Territorial Defense Battalion. This is just what we managed to recover — the commander's social media has since been cleared.

As Sergey Salavatov explained in a conversation with hromadske, he was not interested in politics in 2014, and according to him, his former wife reposted pro-Russian posts from his page.

“I was only listening to music on ‘Odnoklassniki’. I had a wife, and not many people could click anything there… Before the war started, I was involved in the automotive business… I had a lot of work. I didn't have time to get distracted by any moods or politics…” — the man shared.

We spoke with acquaintances of the family, and they found this version questionable.

“I can guarantee: it's not true that she (Salavatov's ex-wife — ed.) is pro-Russian; she is only for Ukraine,” — asserts one of our interlocutors.

Attention is drawn to the photographs that the current commander posted on his social media ten years ago. The images show a green beret with a badge of the French Legion, specifically from the 2nd foreign regiment, which has been absent from the legion for several decades.

In another photo, Sergey Salavatov is allegedly holding an AR-15, and here he is with an SVD. He claims that both the uniform and the weapon were toy replicas. More accurately, they were airsoft replicas.

“Everyone has the right to a hobby… Some drink vodka, others play airsoft. I was into airsoft,” — Salavatov explained.

According to experts familiar with firearms, it is difficult to determine from photographs of such quality whether the SVD is real or an airsoft version, but the AR-15 does appear to be an airsoft replica.

When discussing airsoft in Kramatorsk in the spring of 2014, where Salavatov lived at that time, it should be noted that from April 12 to July 5 of that year, combat actions were ongoing in the city — a local person with airsoft weapons could have easily been killed. However, witnesses reported that at the same time, the so-called militia could have used weapons resembling real firearms.

“After the seizure of the regional state administration in Donetsk, I saw a person there with a pneumatic rifle. Not a replica of a combat weapon, but an actual pneumatic one. I wouldn’t be surprised if this was a common occurrence around March-April 2014, especially on the outskirts,” — recounted an eyewitness of the capture of the Donetsk OGA.

“Overall, it's very strange that at that time someone with civilian intentions like airsoft was hanging out in Kramatorsk in uniform, especially with weapons resembling real ones. It no longer matters who could have shot at them; it would have happened,” — added our interlocutor.

A Blank Spot of One and a Half Years

Of course, photographs are not criminal evidence. However, against the backdrop of the airsoft story and pro-Russian posts on social media, the question arises: what was Sergey Salavatov actually doing from early 2014 until he joined the Armed Forces of Ukraine?

Here, the versions differ even from Sergey himself. Initially, he states that he fought in the Armed Forces from the very beginning: “After that, I fought in it (in uniform — ed.) since 2014; it came in handy in the Armed Forces.” Later, he clarifies that he was assigned to the 73rd Special Operations Center in November 2015.

According to the official data we obtained, Sergey Salavatov joined the Special Operations Center only at the end of 2015. What was he doing for the year and a half prior?

While we were investigating the commander's biography, our editorial office received information regarding phone communications from 2014 to the number that Salavatov still uses (the one we contacted him through).

From May to June 2014, Sergey Salavatov communicated with a certain Mejlum Damirchan. This individual is an employee of the so-called Ministry of Internal Affairs of the “DPR,” who is wanted by the SBU for creating a terrorist group.

Another contact of the current commander is a certain Anton Kalchenko, a militant from the self-proclaimed “DPR” formation “Rusich.” Additionally, Salavatov spoke with Alexander Alekseev — a member of the “General Assembly” in Kramatorsk, which was involved in creating the so-called people's militia. He does not recall any of these individuals.

“I don’t even understand who you’re talking about. I keep telling you: automotive business — bodywork, welding, painting. And I have no idea what clients could have called me,” — said the man.

Let’s assume that these militants and supporters of the “DPR” simply wanted to stop by Salavatov’s service station, and he refused them.

But how can we explain that on May 12 and 13, 2014, Sergey Salavatov called the hotlines to register for the “people’s militia” of the “DPR” twice? He received callbacks from them twice. What these conversations were about is, of course, unknown. The only fact is that they took place.

And here are data from a Russian site recruiting militants and mercenaries that was published ten years ago. It includes both the number and email of Salavatov. In the section “how I can help,” Salavatov noted: “participation, worked for hire.”

Furthermore, the editorial office possesses evidence that in 2014, Sergey Salavatov participated in the so-called referendum — to support the “DPR.”

Polygraph Examination

Did Salavatov fight in the so-called “DPR”? We do not know for sure. Did he have connections with militants? Yes.

Moreover, in the internal database of terrorists maintained by the SBU, next to Salavatov’s name, there was a note — “militant supporter.” There were even intelligence reports indicating that the current commander allegedly underwent a training camp in the “DPR” ten years ago, specializing as a “sniper” and was stationed at militia checkpoints in the Kramatorsk area. According to hromadske, the SBU has not provided a final assessment of this information.

All of this did not prevent Salavatov from building a military career in the Armed Forces of Ukraine. Neither the Special Operations Center since late 2015 nor the Territorial Defense since the start of the full-scale invasion paid attention to this data, which still requires thorough verification.

Therefore, on September 16, we reached out to the SBU, the General Staff, and the command of the Territorial Defense. This was not a request for information, but rather an appeal in which we laid out all known facts and asked for an assessment by conducting a service check on Salavatov. After all, he could be a double agent, and in that case, the curiosity of journalists would alert the counterintelligence department.

On September 24, we received a response from the command of the Territorial Defense. They reported that on September 9, they had contacted the military counterintelligence department of the SBU.

On September 28, Salavatov himself informed hromadske that he had successfully passed the polygraph test. This fact was confirmed to us by the commander of the 109th brigade of the Territorial Defense, Oleg Shershukov.

“He passed the polygraph and all necessary filtering measures; the military counterintelligence provided a report yesterday. The issue of verification has been resolved, as promised by the SBU,” — said the brigade commander.

While Ukrainian legislation does not provide a clear answer as to whether polygraph results can serve as evidence in court, there is no direct permission for the use of polygraphs in judicial practice at all.

Despite the questionable nature of the polygraph as a method, we inquired with our own sources about how Salavatov’s examination went. According to them, the polygraph was conducted, but it was formal. There were no specific questions about whether Salavatov knew the militants we mentioned, what they talked about, or why he submitted his