The Volhynia tragedy: What really happened? Volodymyr Vyatrovych discusses the history, politics, statistics, memes, and the "uncomfortable" truths surrounding the event.

About the Memes

Ten years ago, it was in the hromadske studio that Oleg Tsarev articulated the thesis of the "Volhynian massacre," which he seemingly intended to address all the difficult questions that he could not find answers to in his rather limited mind shaped by Soviet propaganda. In reality, this meme is significant and deeper, as it demonstrates how the complex issue of Polish-Ukrainian misunderstandings is crudely manipulated and politicized by anti-Ukrainian forces in Ukraine. It is very sad that our Western neighbors fail to grasp this. They do not see how their narratives, which include tragic pages of our Polish-Ukrainian history, are exploited by individuals like Tsarev or Kolesnichenko (another activist from that time).

For our Western neighbors, it should serve as a cautionary tale about why their theses are so caricatured that they are embraced by overt Ukrainianophobes, who are also clearly pro-Russian and pro-Soviet. These are the people who probably never wanted to see an independent Poland. This is telling, as it demonstrates how our Western neighbors are sometimes utterly blinded on this issue, not just in one eye but both. They completely fail to recognize who is using this subject in the fight against everything Ukrainian. These interests have nothing to do with the desire to come to terms with the past, let alone improve Ukrainian-Polish relations.

On the Attempts at Discussion

We are open to discussion. We would like such a dialogue. Moreover, I can recall that I was one of the organizers of a special platform for this discussion in 2014. After the victory of the Revolution of Dignity in March, I became the head of the Ukrainian Institute of National Memory. One of my first steps was to reach out to my counterparts at the Polish Institute of National Memory, urging them to establish cooperation.

One element of this was the creation of an incredibly important platform — the Ukrainian-Polish Forum of Historians. Twice a year — once in Poland and once in Ukraine — several Polish and Ukrainian historians gathered to discuss specific topics in detail. For instance, September 1939: what Ukrainians did, what Poles did, what political formations were active. We compared our data, argued. Each prepared for this, gathering historical materials to present. This was highly valuable and continued until around 2017 or 2018.

As I began to explore sources regarding the Polish-Ukrainian conflict, I realized how different the picture becomes when these Ukrainian sources are included in discussions about Poland and Ukraine. I believe we were on the brink of significant shifts in understanding this issue.

However, these shifts did not interest Polish politicians who built their political careers on the notion that Ukrainians were allegedly to blame for everything, insisting that they should evaluate the Polish-Ukrainian conflict as they see fit: condemning Bandera, Shukhevych, and the UPA. They were not interested in the possibility of a reassessment of this topic. Thus, crude political interference in this discussion began. At one of the recent meetings, a participant, a respected professor, started making political statements, demanding that we condemn certain actions of the Ukrainian government, shocking the other Polish attendees.

Ultimately, a definitive end was put to this dialogue when a law was passed declaring that this conflict was genocide perpetrated by Ukrainian nationalists against the Polish population, with denial of this fact carrying criminal liability. We lost this platform. After that, Polish politicians remained the main representatives of this issue.

On Terminology and Preconditions

The term "Volhynian massacre" or even "Volhynian tragedy" is inadequate for assessing what occurred. It cannot be limited to Volhynia, as the conflict was much broader geographically. At its core lies the confrontation between both national movements — Ukrainian and Polish. I am convinced that there are ample grounds to speak of a Ukrainian-Polish war. The main actors in this war were the Polish underground and the Ukrainian underground, each aiming for a very specific political goal — to seize the territories that each considered their own.

When in 1919 the ZUNR lost the war to Poland, and in 1923 the territories of western Ukraine were recognized as belonging to the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, Poland was obliged to respect the rights of national minorities, particularly Ukrainians. However, none of this was implemented.

All Polish state policy until 1939 revolved around constant assimilation and its intensification. This included the destruction of Ukrainian churches and concerns regarding education. Ukrainians were essentially regarded as second-class citizens. You could not obtain any position in government or military service. Thus, Poland effectively raised an entire generation of professional revolutionaries. A critical mass of people emerged, possessing the potential, ambitions, and understanding that just because their ancestors, their parents lost the war, they would not have a life here. Hence, they resolved for themselves — no, they lost the war, but we will take revenge.

As World War II unfolded, the OUN became the main representative of the Ukrainian movement. The Polish movement also reformed into an underground organization after the fall of the state. There were politicians who believed that the movement to restore Poland should continue.

In 1941, the German-Soviet war began. It seemed there were all grounds for both national movements to find common ground, as neither had their own state. It would have been appropriate to negotiate how to fight together against the Germans and possibly against the Soviets.

Negotiations continued in 1941-1942. The mediator was Metropolitan Andrey Sheptytsky, who sought to prevent confrontation. However, the talks stalled over territorial issues. Undoubtedly, neither side could budge. When political means run out, unfortunately, military means come into play.

This led to a confrontation that escalated into a large-scale war between both underground movements, compounded by additional factors such as peasant wars, where the issue was no longer political but revenge for someone allegedly taking my land instead of me, because they were sent here by the Polish state, and that land should have been mine; it should have fed my family. Revenge for religious insults, social insults, personal insults. All this unfolded against the backdrop of a very brutal World War II, where the distinction between civilian and military blurs, and war crimes become commonplace.

Undoubtedly, the moral bar of both societies fell. This was no longer just a clarification of political relations or a war between two underground armies — it led to a general confrontation between Ukrainians and Poles, village against village. Hence, the high number of civilian casualties in this conflict.

On the Numbers

The figure of 100,000 is almost sacralized, I would even say. It is easy to remember. It has indeed reached meme status. The problem is that no one has actually counted. More importantly, this figure is already present in all necessary documents regarding this issue, passed by the Polish parliament.

There is a single attempt to count the victims of the Polish-Ukrainian conflict, based on oral testimonies recorded in the 1990s, conducted by Wladyslaw and Ewa Semashko. According to their estimates, there were about 30,000 victims from the Polish side in this conflict. Despite numerous errors noted by both Polish and Ukrainian historians, no other specific counts have been conducted.

In Ukraine, there is currently a very serious project based at UCU, where, using a methodology primarily grounded in documents, verification of victims is being done by name. The focus has largely been on Ukrainian victims — this is also important because the ratio of 100,000 to 5,000 is already being sacralized from the Polish side.

Thus, according to UCU's estimates, which are still ongoing, around 30,000 killed Ukrainians have already been identified. This shows a completely different ratio. I am sure they will also take on the counting of Polish victims of this conflict. I have seen many documents from those years created by the underground, which counted the number of these victims. The figures mentioned were around 15,000 killed in 1943-1944 in Volhynia. Thus, in reality, we are talking about a large number, about tens of thousands on both sides. I believe that the greatest manifestation of respect for the deceased is precisely to name them.

On Politicization

In fact, this topic began to enter the Polish political agenda around the early 2000s. This is connected with another historical discussion that took place in Poland at that time and with deeper stereotypes and perceptions that Poles have about themselves.

Polish society has always believed that they are the greatest victims in world history, as all sociologists show. Once, Mickiewicz said that Poland is Christ among nations, referring, in fact, to divided Poland back in the 18th century. This fell on very fertile ground. To this day, the vast majority of Poles are convinced that they are the nation that suffered the most, for example, in World War II. Although, clearly, history tells a different story.

This part of the mentality came under attack around the early 2000s when discussions began about the involvement of Poles in the extermination of the Jewish population